Criteriologically

The conceptual netword of para (Schema IV) forks in two, according to the type of intervention on behalf of the conceptualizer, which is implied (cf. section 2.2) in the establishment of the relationship between the PS and the PO: the domain the PO applies to can be delimited by the individual sphere of an agent, i.e. a volitional instance, or it can be defined rather criteriologically, as the nature of evolving reality, which obeys standards rooted in intersubjective knowledge.

Truth, then, could be conceived in an abstract sense by a metaphysical ontology, or by a logical Semantics, to be a matter of correspondence between facts and propositions, which is criteriologically meaningsless, or to be a matter of private evidence about the correspondence of my propositional intentions with the self-given phenomena.

However, one might note that the same difficulty arises with regard to the trancendental-pragmatic idea of the ultimate consensus, whereas Apel explicitly claims that a satisfactory philosophical account of truth -- of course, he considers his own account as such -- should be criteriologically relevant.